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Abstract 
The opening of the Palace of Auburn Hills, SkyDome, and Oriole Park at Camden Yards 
led to the beginning of a construction boom in professional sport.  In the National 
Football League (NFL) alone, 26 stadiums have been built or renovated in the past ten 
years.  Due to the additional revenue generated by these facilities and the NFL’s current 
revenue sharing system, professional football franchises are building new stadia for 
economic reasons rather than to replace unusable or unsafe facilities.  The purpose of this 
study was to determine if a significant difference in net revenue change existed for NFL 
teams that moved into a new facility and to determine if there was a significant change in 
valuation for these franchises.  The findings indicated that new stadia significantly 
increase revenue and franchise value in the NFL; therefore, the primary goal of every 
firm, wealth maximization, is met for teams after opening a new facility. 
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Introduction 
Fans of American professional sports have recently seen dramatic changes in the 
facilities in which teams play.  The opening of the Palace of Auburn Hills in 1988 for the 
Detroit Pistons, SkyDome in 1989 for the Toronto Blue Jays, and Oriole Park at Camden 
Yards in 1992 for the Baltimore Orioles sparked the beginning of a construction boom in 
professional sport not seen since the late 1960s (Greenberg & Gray, 1996).  In the 1990s, 
teams in the major American professional sport leagues began demanding new facilities 
or the remodeling of existing ones despite the structural viability of their current homes.  
The Miami Heat of the National Basketball Association typified this need for a new 
facility when they moved from 11 year-old Miami Arena to the new American Airlines 
Arena in 1999.    
In the National Football League (NFL), 26 stadiums have been built or renovated 
during the past 10 years.  Nine NFL teams have plans to move into a new stadium, or 
actively pursue a new facility within the next three years, including teams like the 
Indianapolis Colts, who recently renovated their current venue and are now pursuing a 
new venue (Duberstein, 2002).  It is likely that within five years, few, if any, NFL 
facilities will exist that were built or significantly remodeled before 1992.  Signifying this 
construction and remodeling trend is the discussion of expanding Texas Stadium or 
building a new facility for the Dallas Cowboys, despite their consistent rank in the top 
15% of NFL team revenues and their multiple Super Bowl victories in the 1990s 
(Robinson, 1997).   
NFL Financial Structure 
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The NFL’s stadium construction and remodeling boom can be attributed to its 
current revenue sharing system, rather than immediate needs to replace unusable or 
unsafe facilities.  Although the NFL shares a greater percentage of its total revenue 
among its teams than the other major North American professional sports leagues 
(Badenhausen & Nikolov; 1997, Gotthelf, 1998), the current financial structure of the 
league has encouraged teams to attempt to expand the revenues generated from their 
stadium, as these income sources are not shared.   The NFL equally distributes revenues 
from national broadcasting contracts (Greenberg & Gray, 1996; Robinson, 1997) and 
maintains a 60-40 split of home/visitor ticket revenue (just altered to more fairly 
distribute incomes to all teams).  The NFL recently allowed teams to become exclusive 
distributors of their licensed merchandise; however, only the Dallas Cowboys have 
assumed control of the potential of this unshared revenue source (Bernstein, 2001).    
The NFL currently shares 70% of its total proceeds through its revenue sharing 
plan (Alesia, 2002).  From this shared revenue pool, each franchise received 
approximately $75 million during the 2002 season (Green Bay Packers, 2002).  However, 
since the NFL is a multi-billion dollar entity, the remaining 30% of unshared revenues 
can result in team revenue discrepancies which, according to the NFL, exceed $50 
million (Kaplan, 2003a).  The unshared 30% of league revenues primarily are generated 
from stadium operations (e.g., naming rights deals, parking, concessions, and luxury 
suites), hence the perceived need to build or remodel facilities to maximize these revenue 
sources. 
The salary cap created through the NFL’s present Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA) also encourages franchises to seek increased unshared revenues from 
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their facilities.  Retaining current players or signing free agents with up-front signing 
bonuses enables teams to circumvent (in the short term) the present year’s salary cap by 
allocating the bonus to future years.  CBA rules governing signing bonuses state that the 
cap does not include all salary paid to players in a given season (National Football 
League, 1998).  For example, in 2000 a player signed a three-year contract for $2 million 
per year, with a $6 million signing bonus.  While the player received $8 million in the 
first year of the new contract (the $6 million signing bonus plus the $2 million in salary), 
only $4 million counted against the cap that year.  CBA rules state that signing bonuses 
are allocated equally over the years (a maximum of seven) of the player’s contract.  
Therefore, teams without the increased revenues derived from a new facility may not 
have the cash necessary to attract or retain the league’s top performing players while 
using CBA rules to manipulate the salary cap to the team’s advantage.         
NFL Stadium Construction 
One goal of every firm is long-term wealth maximization, which is reflected in a 
firm’s overall financial worth or its stock price (Groppelli & Nikbakht, 2000; Shim & 
Siegel, 2000).  The primary determinants of a firm’s value are cash flow, growth rate of 
cash flow, and risk or uncertainty of cash flow.  While an increase in the amount of cash 
flow tends to increase the value of an asset, the value decreases if cash flow becomes 
uncertain.  As these relationships are essential to the valuation of any asset, the 
responsibility of a financial manager is to increase cash flow while controlling for risk 
(Groppelli & Nikbakht, 2000). Therefore, the primary concern of firms when maximizing 
value is to acquire secure revenue sources (Shim & Siegel, 2000).  Although owners of 
professional sport franchises have differing opinions regarding expenditure or retention 
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of revenues and the method by which to maximize yearly or long-term profits (e.g., 
streamline player and operational costs versus acquiring and marketing a better on-field 
product) (DeSchriver & Jensen, 2002), a new stadium, depending on ownership and lease 
agreements, provides additional sources of revenue and cash flow that can be employed 
in whichever fashion an owner wants. 
In an effort to maximize wealth through new or refurbished facilities, NFL 
owners have often sought public assistance through taxes, infrastructure improvements, 
land, or other political considerations (Badenhausen & Kump, 2001).  NFL teams have 
argued that financial subsidies are repaid to the citizenry by the positive financial and 
psychic effects the stadium and the teams’ presence have upon the local community (Noll 
& Zimbalist, 1997; Rappaport & Wilkerson, 2001).  Despite economic studies (Baade, 
1994; Rosentraub, 1997; Badenhausen & Kump, 2001) disputing the benefits to the 
citizenry in relationship to the incredible investment requirements (often exceeding $200 
million) and growing public backlash to corporate welfare, numerous NFL teams, 
including the Denver Broncos, Detroit Lions, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Seattle Seahawks, 
and Pittsburgh Steelers, have recently been successful in obtaining large public subsidies 
for new stadium construction.   
Additionally, the NFL has created new sources of funding to augment financial 
shortfalls for teams wanting to construct a new facility.  Franchises that are unable to 
individually finance construction or cannot persuade the local citizens or government to 
provide funding may utilize low interest loans from the NFL G3 Fund (“It’s All About,” 
2002).  This fund became necessary as the cost of NFL stadia rose and as the proportion 
of construction costs paid by the team increased.  According to Duberstein (2002), the 
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average cost of an NFL stadium built in the 1990s was $232 million, while in the early 
2000s the cost rose to $391 million.  Further, teams have paid an average of 30% of the 
construction costs for a new facility since 1995 (“It’s All About,” 2002).   
G3 Fund guidelines and league rules stipulate that a franchise may borrow up to 
$150 million from the fund.  This capital is then paid back over a 15 year period from the 
visitor’s share of club-seat revenue (Kaplan, 2003b).  The capital available from the G3 
Fund signifies the importance the NFL has placed upon improving cash flow and 
acquiring new revenues from facilities.  The importance the league places on new sources 
of cash flow was reinforced in 2002 when the NFL increased the size of the available 
fund by $350 million, a 75% increase over the fund’s initial amount (“It’s All About,” 
2002).   
Purpose 
 The purpose of this investigation was to determine if a significant difference in 
net revenue change existed for NFL teams that moved into a new facility from 1995-1999 
and to determine if there was a significant change in valuation for these NFL franchises.   
Methodology 
Sources of Data 
Until recently, the ability to analyze the impact of a new stadium on NFL 
revenues and expenses was educated guesswork (Badenhausen & Nikolov, 1997; 
Leonard, 1998).  Teams were unwilling to release confidential financial records, even 
after claiming a significant operating loss during labor negotiations.  Fans, members of 
the media, and even NFL team officials have speculated and discussed the financial 
adjustments that will result when teams occupy a new facility.  However, the ability to 
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accurately assess these changes was not possible until recent litigation involving the 
Oakland Raiders led to the release of the 1995 -1999 financial information for each NFL 
franchise (King, 2001).  Although NFL owners and other consultants disputed the 
accuracy of the expense and profit portions of the report, the accuracy of revenues for 
each team has not been challenged (Zimbalist, 2001). 
Since the early 1990s, Financial World and Forbes have calculated and reported 
the value of franchises in the four major North American sport leagues.  These reports 
have often led to complaints from team officials that the value computed for a franchise 
is not accurate (“Forbes: Red Wings,” 2002; “Redskins Score Touchdown,” 2002).  
However, it has been stated that franchise executives might purposefully dispute the 
numbers as being an overstatement of a team’s financial position and value in order to 
keep fans from demanding that a team spend more on players (“Forbes: Red Wings,” 
2002).  In addition, maintaining financial secrecy helps prevent teams from legitimately 
justifying increased ticket prices, limits on salaries and benefits to players in collective 
bargaining, and the need for public financing for new facilities.  In fact, Zimbalist has 
implied that the Forbes estimates might be conservative, as Forbes bases value on current 
sources of revenue and does not consider future sources such as additional revenue from 
new luxury suites (Alesia, 2002). 
Sample 
Seven NFL franchises opened new stadia during the 1995 – 1999 timeframe: 
Washington Redskins, Carolina Panthers, Tampa Bay Buccaneers, Baltimore Ravens, St. 
Louis Rams, Tennessee Titans, and Cleveland Browns.   The financial information 
released during the Oakland Raiders lawsuit (King, 2001) was examined to determine the 
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changes in local team revenue after moving into a new facility.  Valuation information 
for each franchise was gathered from Financial World and Forbes magazines1. 
Procedures 
To control for inflation, the financial data for the seven teams and the valuation of 
the teams were first converted to 2001 dollars using the Consumer Price Index 
(www.bls.gov/cpi/). 
The financial statements released during the Oakland Raider’s lawsuit included 
revenue (local and shared) and expense statements for each NFL team (“NFL Team 
Financial,” 2001) (see Figure 1 for an example).  In the court documents, local team 
revenue was divided into ticket sales, local television and radio, loge boxes, concessions, 
advertising/parking/other, and miscellaneous.  Information on franchise values was 
gathered from Financial World (1995 – 1997) and Forbes (1998 – 1999). 
             
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
             
Data Analysis and Results 
Using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, a pretest-posttest design was 
utilized to measure the effect of stadium opening on local revenue and franchise value.  
The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test is a nonparametric test used to measure 
the effect of a treatment on pre and post-treatment observations, where the same subjects 
are measured twice (Zikmund, 2000).   
The results indicated that there was a significant difference between pre-stadium 
opening revenue and post-stadium opening revenue at the .05 level in the areas of ticket 
                                                 
1 Financial World provided estimates until its demise in 1998.  Forbes continued the analysis in 1999. 
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sales, loge box revenue, advertising/parking/other and total local revenue.  The average 
increase in total local revenue was 85%, with a 54% increase in ticket sales, a 623% 
increase in loge box revenue, and a 202% increase in advertising/parking/other (see Table 
1).  Significant differences at the .05 level were not found in the areas of local television 
and radio revenue, concessions, and miscellaneous revenue.   
A significant difference at the .05 level was found in firm value.  The average 
increase in firm value was 35% (see Table 2). 
             
 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here. 
             
 
Discussion 
These data indicate that new stadia significantly increase gross operating revenues 
in the NFL, with the largest percentage increase in loge box revenue (623%).  The 
importance of loge boxes as a revenue source for NFL team owners can be seen through 
an examination of luxury suites in stadia/arenas based upon professional sport league.  In 
2000, there were 3,379 luxury suites in the NFL.  This total was 1,406 more than the 
National Hockey League, the league with the second greatest number of suites (Miller, 
2001). At the team level, FedEx Field, home of the Washington Redskins, has 280 luxury 
suites.  Prior to moving to FedEx Field in 1997, the Redskins played at RFK Memorial 
Stadium, a facility with no luxury suites (Duberstein, 2002). 
Club seating is a source of revenue that is not completely shared among NFL 
team owners.  Again, stadia in the NFL have a far greater number of club seats than the 
remaining three major North American professional sport leagues.  According to Miller 
(2001), NFL stadia held 47% of all club seats for the four major professional sport 
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leagues (228,408 club seats).  Going further, if one examines NFL stadia by decade built, 
the importance of this form of revenue to team owners is evident.  For the 16 stadia built 
prior to 1990, the average number of club seats per stadium is 3,961.  The average is 
8,740 for those 16 stadia built in the 1990s and 2000s (Duberstein, 2002). 
This study confirms the theory that the revenue-generating power of an NFL 
franchise is primarily predicated upon stadium economics rather than factors traditionally 
associated with market size (population, media outlets, etc.).  Prior to moving into the 
new stadia, the range of local revenue for the seven teams was $27.2 million to $38.1 
million.  After the move to the new stadia, the range was $42.3 million to $72.0 million 
(Table 3).  Each of these teams generated more local revenue than the New York Jets 
($40.4 million), a franchise located in the largest market in the United States.  Also 
interesting to note, of the seven teams opening new stadia during the timeframe of this 
analysis, three teams, St, Louis, Baltimore and Tennessee, were teams that relocated to 
new, smaller (by population) cities because of the willingness of those municipalities to 
build new facilities for the franchises. 
             
Insert Table 3 about here. 
             
 
Further, the data indicate that new stadia significantly increased franchise value.  
As Table 4 depicts, the value of each franchise increased by an average of 35%.  The 
2001 value of each of these franchises was greater than the value of the New York Jets 
and New York Giants, the two teams in the largest media market in the U.S. 
(Badenhausen & Kump, 2001). 
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Insert Table 4 about here. 
             
 
Conclusions 
As Groppelli and Nikbakht (2000) and Shim and Siegel (2000) noted, the primary 
goal of a firm is long-term wealth maximization, which is reflected in a firm’s overall 
financial worth.  NFL owners moving their teams into new stadia will achieve long-term 
wealth maximization.   
Value for an NFL franchise in a new facility is increased as cash flow improves 
and the risk and uncertainty of future cash flow diminish.  Importantly, of the teams 
examined for this study, unshared local revenue increased an average of 85%.  This 
increase in franchise revenue coincided with an average increase in franchise value of 
35%.  As a new stadium significantly improves a franchise’s revenue and value, the 
supposition of Shim and Siegel (2000) is supported.  The primary concern of firms, 
which in this study were NFL franchises, when maximizing value is to acquire secure 
revenue sources, or to develop additional sources of unshared revenue via a new stadium. 
As the results of this study indicated, the primary goal of the firm is met for NFL 
franchises when they move into a new stadium, therefore justifying a team owner’s desire 
for a new venue.  In order to keep meeting the goal of the firm, the financial managers of 
NFL franchises will have to continue looking for ways to increase cash flow while 
controlling for risk.  Mahony and Howard (2001) specifically addressed problems 
financial managers will face in regard to risk, and their main concern was whether the 
debt will be repaid prior to the end of the useful life of the facility. 
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A new stadium, as previously indicated, will greatly increase the unshared 
revenue of a NFL franchise; however, a financial manager must be aware of the costs of 
building the new stadium and the risk associated with potential revenue streams.  With 
teams presently paying a greater percentage of stadium costs and the overall costs of 
building new stadia increasing at a rate greater than inflation, debt load could become 
problematic for franchises, especially if the payment period is extended beyond the 
financial life of the facility.  As Mahony and Howard (2001) noted, since the 1990s, 
major league teams have spent $120 million, on average, on new facility construction.  
For many of these franchises, this has meant an annual debt obligation ranging from $15 
million to $30 million per year.  As a result, some or all of the added revenue generated 
by a new facility may be tied to the team’s debt service. 
The NFL tried to address this issue when it created the G3 Fund.  Instead of each 
team attempting to secure a loan based upon its own revenue streams, the league 
borrowed money using its $18.3 billion television contract as collateral; therefore, the 
league can lend teams money from the fund at a lower rate than the teams can acquire 
individually (“It’s All About,” 2002), resulting in smaller debt service for NFL franchises 
when compared to franchises in other professional sport leagues. 
Despite the creation of the G3 Fund, teams in the NFL are still increasing their 
financial dependence on the corporate community (Mahony & Howard, 2001).  For 
example, the New England Patriots opened Gillette Stadium, a $397 million privately 
financed2 facility in 2002 (Duberstein, 2002).  Assuming that the Patriots borrowed $125 
million from the G3 Fund, an additional $272 million was needed to construct the 
                                                 
2 The Patriots did receive between $75 and $100 million from the State of Massachusetts for infrastructure 
improvements around the stadium. 
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stadium.  The Patriots plan to use luxury suite rentals, club seating, and stadium naming 
rights to secure the remaining portion of stadium debt (Munsey & Suppes, 2002).  As 
Mahony and Howard (2001) noted, this can become challenging when revenue from 
luxury seating is the primary source of income for a team’s debt obligation.  The Patriots 
plan to generate $80 million over the first 10 years of the stadium’s use from luxury 
seating (Munsey & Suppes, 2002).  However, once the 10 year leases expire on the 
luxury suites at Gillette Stadium, the Patriots must renew current suite holders or find 
new corporations to replace those choosing not to renew in order to meet long-term debt 
service obligations.  Renewal or sales to new corporations could be difficult in times of 
economic uncertainty or duress. 
Reliance on naming rights to secure stadium funding can also be problematic.  
Again the New England Patriots provide an example of the risk associated with naming 
rights revenue.  CMGI purchased the naming rights for the Patriots new stadium from 
2000 – 2020, for $120 million.  However, CMGI filed for bankruptcy in February, 2002 
(Duberstein, 2002).  Subsequently, Gillette purchased the naming rights from 2002 to 
2016 for $90 million, which when annualized averages $6 million per year, the same 
amount as the CMGI rights deal (“Naming-rights Deals At,” 2002).  However, the 
Patriots will have to resell the stadium name again in 2016 to completely recover the 
amount they were to receive from CMGI.  The Patriots are not unique when it comes to 
bankruptcy and naming rights deals.  Baltimore, St. Louis, and Tennessee have just 
renamed their NFL stadia after original naming rights holders filed for bankruptcy.  
Additionally, financially troubled 3Com recently let their naming rights contract expire 
with San Francisco. 
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Mahony and Howard (2001) also stated that the increase in debt load will result in 
an increase in cost to fans.  The results of this study support this assertion.   For the seven 
NFL franchises opening new stadia during the timeframe of this study, the average 
inflation adjusted increase in ticket revenue was 54% while the average increase in 
seating capacity was 14%. 
Recommendations 
The importance of new stadia for increasing local, unshared revenue and firm 
value is evident.  However, there is a need to continue to examine the available NFL 
financial data.  It is unknown if the increase in local revenue and franchise value will be 
maintained over time.  Once initial interest in a new facility wanes (Howard & Crompton, 
2003), fans may require other qualities from their entertainment experience to continue to 
attend games in person (a winning team, promotions, etc...).  It is important to note that 
the NFL has a capacity constraint problem, with over 95% of tickets being sold across the 
league.  Combined with the fact that the NFL regular season schedule consists of only 
eight home games, the novelty effect may last longer in the NFL than in other leagues. 
In addition, despite their comprehensive revenue sharing system currently in 
place, the NFL may again need to revisit their revenue sharing plan after every (or nearly 
every) team builds a new facility.  Once all teams are in a new facility, large market 
teams would more than likely be able to maintain football income superiority to those in 
small markets as market size, not venue amenities, will then dictate the amount of 
unshared revenues generated.  Of course, the willingness of municipalities to fund new 
facilities may wane now that financial data exists which indicates that a new facility 
dramatically changes an individual NFL owners’ football income. 
Revenue and Wealth      16 
A need also exists to examine the stadium effect in other professional and 
collegiate sport settings.  As Greenberg and Gray (1996) stated, a facility boom has been 
occurring in Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, and the 
National Hockey League.  As each league has a different economic system dictating the 
financial structure of the league and its teams, issues related to the financing of stadia and 
arenas in these leagues must be examined along with the effect of new stadia and arenas 
on wealth maximization and franchise value within the leagues. 
The model used by professional sport franchises to fund facilities is now being 
incorporated by colleges and universities as well.  While priority seating has been used in 
collegiate sport for decades and facilities have been named for prominent alumni who 
have donated to the university, the use of corporate naming rights, club seating, and 
luxury seating is increasing.  The Ohio State University athletic department recently 
completed a $200 million renovation of Ohio Stadium and built a $120 million basketball 
and hockey arena.  Debt service, paid by the athletic department, on these two facilities 
and other smaller projects was $20 million in 2002 (the average NCAA Division I-A 
budget was $23.3 million in 2001).  The money to pay off the debt is generated from 
luxury suite rentals, surcharges on tickets, seat license fees, and club seats in both 
facilities (Suggs, 2002).  An example of financing a portion of these facilities can be seen 
through an examination of Ohio State’s Value City Arena.  For the arena, naming rights 
were purchased for $12.5 million and $26.9 million was raised through the sale of seat 
licenses (Wolf, 2002). 
Finally, sport organizations must seriously compare the benefits of a new stadium 
or arena to its costs prior to entering into an agreement to build a new venue, especially if 
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the sport organization has to leverage its future revenue to acquire the capital to build.  
Today, few organizations (e.g., Cincinnati Bengals) have obtained governmental support 
for the entire cost of constructing a new facility.  As previously stated, a team or its 
owner has had to contribute on average $120 million when constructing a NFL facility.  
Often the team includes naming rights as part of its financing portion, even though at the 
time it may be unclear if the team or the municipality controls this revenue source. 
Three major factors need to be considered prior to entering a commitment to 
build.  First, the organization must determine the level of financial support the 
community is willing to provide.  It is always in the interest of a franchise to secure as 
much public financing as possible, even if economic factors indicate a team could 
successfully finance the project privately (e.g., the San Francisco Giants and PacBell 
Park).  An owner considering alternatives to increase revenue can invest $30 million on 
player payroll or he/she can invest $120 million into a $400 million facility, from which 
the organization will receive nearly 100% of revenues.  The owner must realize that $30 
million in payroll gets $30 million in payroll investment, while a $120 million facility 
investment gets $400 million in overall facility investment.  Investment in payroll does 
not guarantee a greater return on investment.  However, data show that a substantial 
capital investment in new venue construction does produce a substantial return on 
investment in both the short term (incremental revenue) and, more importantly, in 
franchise value appreciation over time. 
Second, the organization must determine the increase in cash flow that will occur 
once the facility is built.  Can enough revenue be generated via the facility in its current 
market to make an organizational investment in a facility worthwhile?  Or, after covering 
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debt service obligations, is there enough money left to effectively attract quality players?  
If not, is the municipality/region willing to build a new facility for the organization so 
that it can remain competitive when attempting to retain current players or attract free 
agents? 
Third, the organization must determine the risk associated with the capital project.  
The organization must look at long-term economic forecasts for the market, the market’s 
ability to support a franchise, and the degree to which they are leveraging their franchise 
to build the venue.  For example, in the National Hockey League, the Ottawa Senators 
filed for bankruptcy in 2003 because debt totaling over $240 million depleted the 
resources needed to issue paychecks (Beaudan, 2003).  Included in the debt was $140 
million outstanding on the team’s facility, the Corel Centre (Dupont, 2003).  The 
Senators were also hurt financially because they play in a market of just over one million 
people and they pay players in US dollars (as all other Canadian teams do) while 
generating revenue in Canadian dollars. With the Canadian dollar at a record low as 
compared to the US dollar, Canadian franchises struggle to keep and pay top players 
(Beaudan, 2003; Dupont, 2003). 
If the risk of building a new stadium or arena is determined to be too great and 
little local, public support is available for either entirely funding the venue or increasing 
the public’s share of venue costs, the organization should avoid mortgaging its future.  A 
new market could then be sought.  Or, the organization could examine a less costly 
solution to increasing venue revenue, renovation. 
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Table 1 
Increase in Total Local Revenue of Teams Moving  
into New Stadia (1995 – 1999) 
         
 
Team % increase 
         
 
Baltimore Ravens 62 
Carolina Panthers 77 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers 83 
Tennessee Titans 134 
Washington Redskins 109 
Cleveland Brownsa NA 
St. Louis Ramsb NA 
  
 
aBegan play in new Cleveland Stadium in 1999 
bMoved into new stadium in middle of season
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Table 2 
 
Increase in Value for Teams Moving into New Stadia  
(1995 – 1999) 
  
 
Team  % Increase 
  
 
Baltimore Ravens 38 
Carolina Panthers 22 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers 83 
Tennessee Titans 12 
Washington Redskins 6 
Cleveland Brownsa NA 
St. Louis Ramsb NA 
  
 
aExpansion franchise not ranked by Financial World or  
Forbes during first year of existence 
bMoved into new stadium in middle of season 
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Table 3 
 
Local Revenuea Pre and Post Move to new Stadium (in Millions) 
           
 
Team Pre Move Post Move 
   
 
Baltimore Ravens $34.9 $56.5 
Carolina Panthers $38.1 $67.2 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers $35.6 $65.3 
Tennessee Titans $27.2 $63.6 
Washington Redskins $32.7 $68.4 
Cleveland Brownsb  $72.0 
St. Louis Ramsc   $42.3 
   
 
aAdjusted to 2001 dollars 
bBegan play in new Cleveland Stadium in 1999 
cMoved into new stadium in middle of season 
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 Table 4 
 
Team Valuea Pre and Post Move to New Stadium (in Millions) 
           
 
Team Pre Move Post Move 
   
 
Baltimore Ravens $259 $357 
Carolina Panthers NR $150 
Tampa Bay Buccaneers $206 $376 
Tennessee Titans $349 $392 
Washington Redskins $208 $221 
Cleveland Brownsb NR $563 
St. Louis Ramsc  $178 $218 
   
 
aAdjusted to 2001 dollars 
bExpansion franchise 
cMoved into new stadium in middle of season 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1. Washington Redskins team financial performance, 1999 
 
Revenues (in $1,000s) 
 Ticket Sales       44,463 
 Local TV and Radio        8,549 
 Loge Boxes       14,642 
 Concessions         3,547 
 Advertising/Parking/Other       9,914 
 Miscellaneous         2,812 
  Total Local Revenue     83,927 
 
 Common Revenuesa      64,784 
  Total Revenues   148,711 
 
Expenses (in $1,000s) 
 Player Costs       73,207 
 Team Expenses      10,068 
 Stadium Rental           -   
 Stadium Operations      20,367 
 G&A          7,553 
 PR          1,518 
  Total Operating Expenses  112,713 
 
 Common Expensesb        3,640 
 
Operating Profit (in $1,000s)      32,358 
 
aIncludes National Television and Radio, International Television, NFL Properties, 
Enterprises, and Films. 
 
bIncludes League Office and Management Council expenses. 
